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II
King H enry II and his Legal Reforms 
By Michael Nicholas ‘07
The legal reforms implemented under Henry II produced a body o f law and 
custom that formed the basis o f the English Common Law. Institutions seen as the 
foundation for legal administration and procedural due process owe their existence to 
these assizes and ordinances instituted during the twelfth century. Despite their 
significance, however, their origins were neither intended to revolutionize the 
administration o f royal justice throughout England nor were these reforms issued in 
deliberate or comprehensive fashion. Rather, they were instituted in different decrees, 
each one addressing a particular administrative need. Thus while Henry II’s greatest 
legacy is the establishment o f the English Common Law, his intent was simply that of 
every ruler, to consolidate seigniorial power and increase efficiency in royal 
administration. Henry’s choice of vehicle for this task was reformation o f  the legal 
process, and what emerged due to his efforts were significant changes in the body o f 
civil, criminal and ecclesiastical law.
With the Treaty o f Westminster Henry II ascended to the throne o f England in 
1154 following a tumultuous and contentious period following the death o f Stephen. 
Almost immediately, Henry began taking steps to consolidate royal authority and 
administrative control.1 The quick action in relation to his ascension can best be 
analyzed through a brief examination o f the period immediately preceding Henry’s reign.
The reign o f Stephen was a disaster, largely due to both his own incompetence as 
a ruler as well as baronial resentment from the policies o f Henry I, whom Henry II held 
as the archetype for seigniorial authority.2 Henry I had established almost absolute 
control over the legal administration o f England. His jurisdiction and authority overruled 
those o f  the barons and the local manorial administrators. The sheriffs o f each county 
were subject to the direct wishes o f the sovereign and had neither the inclination (in most 
cases) nor the authority to obey a local lord over that o f the King. Due to this, Henry II 
believed Henry I’s reign to be one o f  peace, justice, order, and general contentedness.
1 Joseph Biancala. “For W ant o f  Justice: Legal Reform s o f  Henry II”  Columbia Law Review (Apr. 1988): 
434
2 John Hudson. The Formation of the English Common Law (London: Longm an, 1996.):144
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Furthermore, Henry II associated such a condition with strength and robustness, 
particularly when examining the fitness of the ruler. Thus Henry II’s own professed 
desire was to return to the days o f the “Lion o f Justice,” Henry I.3
Evidence o f this intent is seen clearly in his coronation oath, where the usual 
recitations promising protection o f Church property and his subjects’, and a tireless effort 
against unlawfulness and disorder were complemented with Henry II 's own twist, a 
promise to protect the rights of the Crown and the jurisdiction implicit therein as 
sovereign and King.4 5This additional clause provided an early indication o f Henry’s 
intention to consolidate royal authority.
The need for such consolidation,.particularly in Henry’s mind, can be traced from 
the “ideal” days o f Henry I to the period immediately proceeding his reign. Baronial 
discontent from the iron grip o f Henry I led to Stephen’s prevention of achieving the 
same autocratic authority. While both King and baron were dependent upon each other 
for the legitimacy o f their own claims to power, neither recognized the state o f mutual 
dependency and each attempted to assert superiority through the subjugation o f the 
other.5 This constant struggle led to a spiraling state o f civil war and general unrest.
With this degradation o f order came a decentralization o f legal authority and the loss of 
royal prominence.
Local manorial courts now had primary jurisdiction over both civil and criminal 
claims made by those on their property. Tenurial rights were respected at the whim of 
the local baron, and the law governing property and succession was based more upon 
local custom than it was uniformity o f principle. Indeed the sheer number of jurisdictions 
illustrates the state of decentralization: courts o f the vill and the manor, hundred courts 
and shire courts, borough courts, honorial courts, etc. etc.6 7Church courts held near 
absolute authority in matters o f Church officials, both low (clerks) and high (bishops), 
and jurisdiction was removed almost entirely to their discretion when the local bishop so 
desired.7 Thus the cornerstone o f reestablishing Crown control over the administrative 
processes o f England in the manner o f Henry I was twofold: consolidate the 
accoutrements o f administration and do so by expansion o f the legal jurisdiction of the 
Crown.
While the second point appears predicated upon the first, it is in and of itself an 
independent action. The drive for consolidation was Henry’s motivating force, using 
legal jurisdiction was merely a vehicle to achieve that goal. Henry was not viewed as a 
legal genius per se, but rather as “one o f the greatest politicians o f his time...and by 
consent o f historians o f his time, first and foremost a legislator and administrator.”8 Thus 
while colloquially his constitutions and assizes are referred to collectively as his 
“reforms,” there was not, in Henry’s mind, a conscious “plan o f reform.”9 Henry’s 
decisions were based upon the need and the desire to consolidate royal authority and 
establish seigniorial power as preeminent through England, and to further subjugate the 
barons’ ability to challenge his reign by seizing control o f the legal apparatus. In
3 IBID
4 Hudson, 145
5 Biancala, 435
6 W.L. W arren. Henry II(London: Eyre Methuen, 1973). 317
7 Hudson, 145
8 Theodore Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law (London: Butterworth and Co. Ltd, 1956). 19
9 W arren, 317
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recognition o f the controversy surrounding his ascension and the condition under which 
he inherited the throne from Stephen, Henry did not simply “take” control away from the 
barons (such an action would have inevitably led to further war), rather he used a 
piecemeal system of give and take, sometimes bowing to baronial jurisdiction while at 
other times claiming his own, thus slowly building his influence instead o f attempting to 
seize it at once.10 *12
This motivation is important in terms o f placing the actual reforms o f Henry II in 
the proper context. The genius o f  Henry II was in his need for and natural acuity towards 
organization, not necessarily legal initiative.11 12 The institutions o f law that are credited to 
Henry II (jury system, land reforms, process o f writs) were in fact not his original 
conceptions. In fact under Henry’s reign no particular process was itself established. 
Rather, Henry fused together selected precedents and issued new rationalization for old 
customs to achieve his particular end. What resulted from this transmutation was the 
foundation for English Common Law, but no single development was itself an original 
idea, but rather the result of “the practical decisions o f busy men responding intelligently 
to practical problems that were nothing new in themselves, but which had never before 
encountered an authority that made a habit o f asking not simply what needed to be done, 
but how it could be done better.” 13
Thus while Henry’s motivation was bom out o f a need for royal administration, 
his vessel for such reform lay in the law. Specifically, Henry sought to consolidate royal 
jurisdiction as having primacy over local courts. In the area o f lord and tenant 
relationships, Henry specifically sought to give royal justices authority to hear cases 
where discretion was abused by a local baron and a decision skewed in his favor. Thus 
he issued the Writ o f Right, which according to Glanville (circa 1188-90) held that a lord 
was to “do full right” to a plaintiff who claimed (and proved) that he was being forced off 
o f his property.14 Viewed narrowly this measure was simply administrative, for it 
commanded the local lords to perform their function and execute their power 
appropriately. It neither diminished nor expanded the authority o f the presiding baron 
any more than he in theory already possessed. Rather, it compelled defendants to answer 
to royal authority and it charged lords .with dispensing appropriate justice, ideally the 
justice o f the King.
The imposition o f this writ (or royal order) brought with it several important 
administrative and legal consequences. Firstly, the number of writs issued increased 
dramatically as defendants now felt compelled to answer only in the presence o f a royal 
writ. Secondly, it saddled Henry with the problem of plaintiffs now seeking relief where 
none ought to be granted; thirdly it meant that with a large influx o f  writs issued, a 
procedure would have to be implemented for the adjudication o f such cases.15
It was in the establishment o f this procedure that Henry acted with almost 
absolute authority. Henry successfully coupled procedure for executing various writs 
(including the Writ of Right) with procedure for collecting taxes, record keeping, the
10 Hudson, 146
" L .F . S a lz m a n ,/fe r ry / /  (N ew  York: Russell & Russell, 1914). 175
12 W arren, 317
13 IBID
14 Biancala, 442
15 W arren, 334
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raising o f military forces and the training of royal administrators and justices. In terms of 
technical legal jurisdiction, Henry parlayed with baronial influence to achieve his desired 
ends, but once those measures were enacted, he was able to institute procedures for their 
enforcement nearly at whim.16
With the Writ o f Right, Henry instituted the following procedure: where a 
plaintiff felt that he had been wrongfully deforced o f property he obtained a royal writ 
commanding that the local lord “do full right” in adjudication o f the case and 
implementation o f the appropriate remedy. In this respect the writ was an upward claim 
from tenant to his lord’s court. Contained in the Writ o f Right was a nisi feceris clause, a 
threat that in the event of disobedience, the sheriff would execute the “right” as opposed 
to the lord. If the plaintiff felt that the lord failed to “do lull right,” he would by the 
process known as tolt present the original writ to the sheriff, who would dispatch a 
sergeant and four knights to bear witness to the case being removed to county court. The 
plaintiffs final remedy was by the process of pone, whereby adjudication would be 
brought before the royal justices for a final decision.17
The Writ o f Right was significant in several respects. First, it held that the lord’s 
decision could be overridden by the county court or the royal court if  in fact the decision 
was against local principle or custom. Furthermore, it sought, at least on its face, to 
remove local abuses o f authority by compelling lord’s to act in the manner o f  the King.
In this respect the deeper legal significance o f the Writ o f Right lie not in the procedure, 
but in the fact that seigniorial courts now had jurisdiction over land claims (and the fees 
associated therein). Local authority was maintained as matter o f procedure, but not as a 
matter o f legal interpretation without subjective review by a higher (royal) court. Finally, 
Henry did not restrict the Writ o f Right to upward claims. Downward claims from lord to 
tenant could also be made, and the nisi feceris clause o f each writ could be altered to 
threaten the imposition of appropriate action by the sheriff against the tenant should the 
tenant be at fault.18 
Thus the Writ o f Right served as a compromise with local authority, for while it 
gave the King ultimate control over the legal precedent involved, it gave primary 
procedural command, that is the right of first action and o f first resort, to the local barons 
and their courts, thus allowing for local control at the first stage o f the process. This 
compromise and reform were further promulgated with the assisa novae disseisinae 
(Assize o f Novel Disseisin) in 1166. The assize itself was both an ordinance and a 
procedure, and analyses of both reveal the desire for administrative reform as well as the 
transmutation o f legal precedents acting congruently. By the ordinance, no person could 
be disseised (dispossessed) o f his land (assuming such land was a free tenement) unjustly 
or without a judgment in court. The procedure was the impaneling o f a jury to hear the 
case and decide on the merits thereof.20
In terms o f the actual ordinance no further detail is required; the principle 
elucidated was simple and uncontroversial, and was not an original conception at the
16 Arthur R. Hogue, Origins of the Common Law (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1966) 31
17 Biancala, 443
18 Biancala, 447
19 Frederick Pollock and F.W. Maitland The History of English Law (Cam bridge: Cam bridge University 
Press, 1895). 124
20 Biancala, 467
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time. What was controversial and in that respect significant was the procedure for 
remedy, specifically the granting o f  royal jurisdiction as the appropriate dispenser of 
remedy and by extension, o f justice and the legal apparatus there attached. Upon 
application by a plaintiff and execution o f a writ, the sheriff would impanel a jury of 
twelve recognitors, all o f whom were required to be free men, to sit in the presence o f the 
royal justices and answer a simple question: was the seisin o f land by the defendant just 
given the facts o f  the case in accordance with local custom and applicable royal decrees? 
The legal questions were addressed by the sitting justices, and the facts were determined 
by the jury o f recognitors. An answer in the affirmative would grant a dismissal of the 
case and the upholding o f the seisin. An answer in the negative would immediately 
restore the right o f the disseisined tenant to his land.21
The impact of the establishment o f such procedure was distinct in two ways.
First, it established a distinction between possession o f land (seisin) and ownership of 
land. One could possess land in the form of a tenancy while ownership was retained with 
a higher authority (such as the king). This procedure governed seisin specifically and 
granted a quick and uniform remedy to questions pertaining to that seisin. Secondly and 
more far reaching, free tenements and the seisin thereof are thus by the Writ o f Novel 
Disseisin protected by and beholden to the King, irrespective of the locality or 
jurisdiction of the regional lord.22 This established the King as the protector of tenements 
and by extension gave the King a hand in the administration o f  said lands. Thus Henry 
was able to both respect the ownership of the manorial lords while at the same time 
ensuring that such actions in terms of transfer o f property were done under the auspices 
o f his royal justices, and thus by and under his design. 
The genius o f the Assize o f Novel Disseisin was in the compromise that it struck. 
Seigniorial authority was codified and took precedence, but the actual adjudicating body 
remained the lord’s court. Thus both King and baron had influence, and while the King’s 
authority may be supreme in terms o f legality, the deftness o f Henry’s administration led 
to the belief and acceptance that it was the decision of the baron acting under the 
guidance o f the King, and not under his direction, that governed such land disputes. Thus 
Henry avoided baronial revolt while at the same time solidifying uniform control over 
legal procedure.23
In the furtherance o f consolidation o f  royal authority, specifically as to the 
governance o f land and possession, Henry II promulgated assisa de morte antecessoris 
(the Assize o f Mort d’Ancestor) at the council o f Northampton in 1176. In sum, the 
Assize held that whenever a man died in seisin, or in possession o f a tenement, the first 
claim to inheritance was with the next of kin. The next o f kin could not have the land 
diseisined from him by action o f another holding a valid (but lesser claim), presumably 
the lord under which the tenement was held.24 Where Novel Disseisin prevented an 
individual from usurping the land o f another without just cause, Mort d ’Ancestor 
prevented the same from occurring following the death o f  the person who legally could 
claim seisin to the land. The procedure for proving such a claim was similar to that of
21 Pollock, 125
22 IBID
23 Biancala, 467
24 Pollock, 127
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Novel Disseisin, a jury o f  twelve recognitors was to be convened and would decide the 
case, albeit with different questions presented.25
The jury in this case was asked to decide three pertinent questions. First, did the 
decedent die seised in demesne and fee, that is was the decedent in possession of the 
tenement in question with all o f the incumbent obligations thereof? Second, did the 
decedent die within the appropriate limitations on time and other factors (which varied 
from locality)? Third, was the plaintiff in the case the closest heir, and thus entitled to 
the seised land? In principle, if  the plaintiff could establish an affirmative answer to all 
three of the questions, then he was entitled to a presumption of inheritance of the land, as 
well as the obligations o f such tenancy. Concomitantly established with the Writ o f Mort 
d’Ancestor was the Writ o f Homage governing the tenurial relationship between lord and 
tenant. Previous to Northampton a lord might have refused to recognize the inheritance 
o f  a decedent’s next of kin. Now the legitimate heir possessed a royal writ compelling 
the lord to enter into a tenurial relationship, and vis-a-vis that relationship, compelled the 
heir to pay relief and do “the other things they ought to do” with respect to their lord.26
Therefore Henry, through the writ o f Mort d ’Ancestor, transmuted customs of 
inheritance with homage and formulated a procedure by which land could be inherited 
through the generations. The impact of this effort was twofold. First, Henry unified 
differing conceptions o f  inheritance (and with that differing codes and ordinances) into 
the succinct (sometimes deceptively so) principle that a man who died in seisin could 
pass his land to his family, thus strengthening familial bonds and providing a semblance 
o f order in the social structure. Second, this was done so through royal intervention, 
which served to be another blow to the previous feudal system whereby the manorial lord 
had almost complete control. Thus Henry, through a process o f legal administration, 
allowed for royal intervention in land disputes between lord and tenant. As in the Assizes 
before it, royal authority and precedent reigned, but actual administration was conducted 
in the jurisdiction o f the lord’s manor, albeit before royal justices.27
The Writs o f Right, Novel Disseisin and Mort d’Ancestor slowly consolidated 
royal authority through legal jurisdiction and culminated with the promulgation of the 
Grand Assize o f 1179, whereby any case commenced before a manorial court could, but 
appropriate writ, be removed to a royal court for final adjudication. Thus Henry 
successfully extended royal jurisdiction to nearly all facets o f legal procedure and 
administration with respect to adversarial processes deciding questions o f ownership and 
seisin o f land.28 Prior to this Assize, a dispute o f land ownership was to be decided under 
the custom of trial by combat, whereby the plaintiff would challenge the defendant to 
combat before the local court, with the winner obviously having the case decided in his 
favor.29
Following the issue o f the Grand Assize, a tenant could resolve the land dispute 
by “putting himself upon the Assize” and refuse to consent to his land being disseisined 
from him. The plaintiff could then sue for a writ in royal court commanding that four 
knights be selected by royal justices to appoint a jury o f twelve county gentleman located
25 IBID
26 Biancala, 485
2?B iancala,487
28 Salzman, 180
29 Pollock, 126
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within the district to be empanelled to decide the case. The jury would rely on their own 
knowledge and information to decide who had the more legitimate claim to the land. If 
all twelve could not agree, the four knights would continually reconstitute the jury until a 
unanimous verdict could be reached. All of this was done under the direction and 
authority o f the King.30
The significance o f the Grand Assize took two distinct forms. First, an 
appearance o f order and precedence was established based upon accepted custom and 
law, as opposed to the sloppy and Darwinian ordeal of battle. The winner in these 
disputes now (theoretically) was legally entitled to the land in question instead of simply 
being the superior fighter. Second, royal jurisdiction was now extended to the most basic 
o f  legal disputes: who owns or is in seisin o f a particular piece of land. The influence o f 
the King’s court was now extended into the very heart o f  the feudal lord’s realm, and 
when taken together with the writs o f Right, Novel Disseisin and Mort d ’Ancestor, Henry 
II through the Grand Assize successfully established seigniorial rule over the civil 
administration o f  his kingdom.31
The analyses thus far have been restricted to civil (that is, secular) affairs. Henry 
did not limit his efforts (particularly in land disputes) to civil affairs alone. The Assize of 
Darrein Presentment established a procedure by which Church lands would be 
adjudicated in temporal or royal court. Where Church lands stood vacant a plaintiff 
could apply for a Writ o f Right o f Advowson and a temporal court would decide 
ownership on the principle that “he who presented last time, let him present this time 
also; but this without prejudice to any question of right.”32 In colloquial terms, if two 
persons quarrel over ownership o f Church property, each with equal claim, then a jury 
would be impaneled (called in inquest by neighbors) to decide who presented first, and 
thus who was entitled. Henry sought for this assize to take precedence after the Lateran 
Council of 1179 decreed that the local bishop would assume control of the land if  it 
should be vacant for a period o f three months. Henry’s assize asserted royal, as opposed 
to ecclesiastical jurisdiction to decide the question.33
Finally, in 1164 Henry, through the assisa ulrum (the Assize Utrum) sought to 
extend royal jurisdiction over lands owned by the Church in relation to peasants’ 
obligations therein. Specifically, the question permeating the countryside was whether it 
was the obligation o f citizens to “lay fee or alms,” that is to whether the land was owed a 
fee to the King and his designee, or whether alms should be paid to the Church. The 
Assize Utrum decreed that a jury o f twelve recognitors would decide the question.34 This 
development was significant not in the question presented, but in the jurisdiction where 
the question was answered. Prior to the Assize Utrum, the local bishop, presiding in 
ecclesiastical court, could (and would) decide the issue (most often in favor of the 
Church), and any appeal from this decision would end up in Rome, completely outside 
the realm o f seigniorial justice. Henry sought through this Assize to extend secular 
jurisdiction to disputes between the temporal and spiritual authority within his realm. 
Taken together, the Assize Utrum, Novel Disseisin, Mort d ’ Ancestor and Darrein
30 Salzman, 181
31 Salzm an, 180-182
32 Pollock, 128
33 IBID
34 Pollock, 124
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Presentment became known as the “four petty assizes” and constitute the bulwark o f civil 
reform under Henry II.J3
Henry’s reforms and institutions o f uniform procedural codes did not end with 
civil affairs. Prior to Henry, most criminal cases were decided by ordeal, that is the 
accused would be put through one or more series o f tortures, be it burned alive, drowned, 
combat, etc. to determine if “by God” he was guilty. Such a procedure greatly varied 
depending upon the jurisdiction and had the adverse effect o f not being uniform. 
Therefore degrees in standards for proof permeated throughout the realm depending on 
which ordeal was used for which crime. The punishment was either death upon 
conviction or banishment upon acquittal, and accusations could be made by any local 
official against any peasant.* 36 Furthermore, individual accusations o f a crime could be 
made by an individual (through the Appeal o f Felony), provided however that the accuser 
offers battle to the accused. Such a process sought to protect against frivolous 
prosecution, but also favored those who could do battle over those who could not. 
Depending upon the individual accuser and accused, this almost certainly produced an 
unequal adversaria] process. Thus accusations could be made by official or individual, 
and determination o f guilt was made by ordeal, or the resolution o f dispute made by 
battle. While fines and other forms o f punishments were technically employed and used, 
prior to the Constitution o f Clarendon the most serious crimes were resolved by one of 
the aforementioned methods.37
With the promulgation o f the Constitution o f Clarendon in 1166, Henry sought to 
streamline the process-by which accusations could be made against persons. The Assize 
specifically held that
inquiry shall be made in every county and ever}' hundred through 12 of the more lawful abiding men 
of each hundred and through four of the more law-abiding men of each vill, put on oath to tell the 
truth, whether there is in their hundred or vill any man accused or publicly suspected as robber or 
murderer or thief or anyone who has harboured them since the lord king became king.”38
Thus an accusation could now only be made against a person by the testimony 
under oath o f  a jury o f twelve o f his neighbors. Henry further held that “no one shall 
have jurisdiction or judgment or forfeiture except the lord king in the royal court.”39 
Thus two important reforms were instituted under Henry. First, accusations must be 
made by a presentment jury, that is the jury would declare only if  a crime had been 
committed, and whom they thought responsible for that crime (the modem day 
conception is the grand jury). Once accused, the sheriff would be authorized to hold the 
person in custody until trial. A presentment was not a finding o f guilt but rather a formal 
accusation. This took away the ability and the need for individuals to accuse each other; 
it gave communal voice to accusation.40
33 IBID
36 F.W . M aitland and Francis C. M ontague A Sketch of English Legal History (N ew  York: G.P. Putnam ’s 
Sons, 1915). 66
37 Mike M acnair “Law, Politics and the Jury” Law and History Review Vol. 17 No. 3 (Autum n 1999): 605
38 W.L. W arren The Governance of Norman and Angevin England (Stanford: Standford University Press, 
1987). 108
39 W.L. W arren, 109
40 W .L. W arren, 110
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In regards to serious criminal offenses, under the second reform of Henry, royal 
authority (as constituted in the Assize) overrode any competing local customs, and thus 
upon presentment the case could be remanded to royal court for adjudication. While in 
practice the jury system allowed for communities to be self governing, at least in terms of 
the beginning point o f criminal prosecutions, the Constitution o f Clarendon was not as 
generous as it would be perceived. A presentment jury could be constituted only o f free 
men, and the vast majority o f the population was not free or was in some way indentured. 
Peasants were often accused but could not sit on the accusing body.41 Still, Henry had 
now extended royal jurisdiction to criminal matters beyond the control o f local lords, and 
had further taken accusatory powers away from individual authorities, although in 
practice they still retained significant (if not total) influence.
The actual operation o f the presentment jury was that of a fact-finding body. For 
purposes o f reference, if  a crime had been committed within a district, a presentment jury 
would be convened to ascertain the details o f said crime, the victim, methodology, 
motivation, impact, etc. would all be ascertained by the presentment jury. Finally, any 
individuals suspected of that crime would be considered by the jury and a formal 
accusation could be forthcoming if a trial was warranted as determined by the 
recognitors.42 While Henry removed the trial by ordeal at the accusation stage, it was 
still very much prevalent in the actual trial following presentment. The Constitution of 
Clarendon and its relevant supplement in the Constitution o f Northampton (1176) held 
that upon presentation o f a formal accusation, the accused could (depending on the crime) 
still enter the ordeal and either be killed or exiled, depending upon the result.43
While the actual procedure of the presentment jury seemed to shift accusatory 
authority, the significance o f the Constitutions of Clarendon and Northampton rested with 
the expansion o f royal jurisdiction. Prior to the aforementioned promulgations, the 
King’s court had jurisdiction only in a limited number o f cases and in specific instances. 
All other cases that did not fall under these specified rules were reserved strictly for the 
manorial or county courts. However, Henry expanded the interpretation o f the two chief 
pleas to the Crown: breach o f the peace and felony. Henry went as far as to posit that any 
breach o f the peace now constituted a breach “o f the peace o f our lord King” and that any 
felonious act was a felony against the king, thus granting royal courts primary and final 
jurisdiction.44
Taken together, the use o f the presentment jury and the imposition o f royal 
jurisdiction allowed Henry to dispatch justices and sheriffs loyal to him to administrate 
justice in any area of his realm regardless o f baronial control. It is important to note the 
link between the two. Communal accusation given in the form of a presentment jury 
eliminated (for the most part) reprisals associated with individual accusation. A 
unanimous declaration by twelve recognitors was much less likely to face retaliation than 
was an agent from the king acting alone. Further, should a presentment jury find a breach 
o f the peace, or robbery, murder, or thievery (felonies), then the accusation would be
41 M aitland and M ontague, 167
12 Richard Hudson “The Judicial Reforms o f  the Reign o f  Henry II” Michigan Law Review Vol. 9 No. 5 
(Mar. I9 l  l): 388
43 Richard Hudson, 389
44 Richard Hudson, 389-90
The Histories, Volume 6, Number 2 21
heard in royal court, thus giving Henry tacit control over the accusation process and 
explicit control over criminal adjudication and sanctioning.43
The underlying reform associated with the Constitutions o f Clarendon and 
Northampton is a reform to the Appeal o f Felony, that is the accusation o f a crime.
Henry went further than to simply place authority in the hands of a presentment jury. To 
any individual who would raise a question o f a crime or wrong, or who would present his 
case before a presentment jury, or make an accusation in the hopes that it would take 
formal structure later, Henry required that he either post a bond of surety or swear an oath 
before royal justices to prosecute the claim should it be given a formal, communal voice. 
This served to correct previous problems o f abandonment and lack o f prosecution under 
Henry I and Stephen.45 6 The issue was deeper than simply guarding against frivolous 
prosecutions or ensuring that accusations were heard in the appropriate venue. If appeals 
o f felony never reached a court for trial, then seigniorial influence would be minimal at 
best. Indeed if  most disputes were commenced only to be abandoned due to exterior 
pressures, then the King’s justice would never actually be implemented.
Consequently, Henry liberally allowed his courts to impose fines for 
abandonment o f cases, to seize the collateral or surety held by plaintiffs who failed to 
prosecute their claims, thus ensuring that criminal prosecutions were actually prosecuted 
in royal courts as opposed to languishment or abandonment as in the previous reigns. 
Fines were not restricted simply to cases of abandonment. Certain crimes warranted the 
payment o f large fines, as did presenting or bearing false witness, or making a false 
accusation-. This therefore had the dual effect o f reforming the appeal o f felony and 
adding to Henry’s already growing tax authority.47
While this consolidation o f jurisdiction over criminal matters extended almost 
comprehensively throughout the secular aspects of Henry’s realm, he further sought to 
extend royal jurisdiction to crimes committed against the clergy, and to crimes that 
previously were tried exclusively in ecclesiastical courts. Chapter 13 o f the Assize of 
Clarendon specifically provided for royal jurisdiction in all cases where a bishop suffered 
wrong. Beforehand, such cases had been heard in the bishop’s own court. It is important 
to note that Henry did not seek to alter the basic premise that committing a wrong against 
a bishop or member o f the clergy was itself a felonious act; rather he sought to have the 
cases heard before royal justices and members o f his judiciary as opposed to Church 
authorities.48
Furthermore, Chapter 3 o f the Assize o f Clarendon detailed the specific procedure 
whereby a case would be handed in the event o f a wrong committed against a member of 
the lower clergy. Henry promulgated that an accusation could be made only in a royal 
court, thus reserving secular authority o f the accusing process. Henry did allow for the 
case itself to be tried before an ecclesiastical body, thus guaranteeing that the Church 
would have the ability to determine guilt or innocence o f a particular case. However,
45 Naomi D. Hurnard “The Jury o f  Presentm ent and the A ssize o f  Clarendon” The English Historical 
Review Vol. 56 No. 223 (July 1941): 387
46 Margaret H. Kerr “Angevin Reform  o f  the Appeal o f  Felony” Law and History Review Vol. 13 No. 2 
(Autumn, 1999): 359
47 Kerr, 360-61
48 Plucknett, 110
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punishment was the jurisdiction o f the royal court, thus checking any abuse o f authority 
that may occur on the part o f the bishop.49
This was a significant shift from the previous nearly sovereign jurisdiction held 
by Rome and local bishops over appeals of felony. A local bishop would have the 
authority to accuse, try and punish any person suspected o f committing a wrong against 
the clergy. Appeal from a local bishop took the form of a petition to Rome, ultimately 
ending with the Pope. Regardless o f the outcome, prior to the Assize o f Clarendon, no 
secular court had the jurisdiction or the authority to intervene in such cases. Henry now 
divided the jurisdiction and reserved to himself the ability to accuse and punish those 
found guilty. Final appeal rested with the royal, not papal courts.50
This naturally led to disquiet between Henry, his bishops, and Rome. While 
Henry I and Stephen had always held that final appeal rested with the sovereign, Rome 
had never given its assent to this scheme.51 Nor did Rome give its assent in Henry IPs 
case either; rather Henry was able to institute the effects o f  the Assize o f Clarendon by 
summoning the members o f the clergy and bishops and persuading them to agree to the 
Assize as promulgated. This was further evidence o f Henry’s skill as a politician and 
deftness in pushing through his reforms without the discontent as under Henry I nor open 
rebellion as under Stephen. He was in fact able to persuade all bishops to give their 
assent except one: Thomas Beckett.52
The refusal o f Beckett to recognize Henry’s authority and to assent to royal 
jurisdiction would become the principal thorn in Henry’s side throughout his reign. The 
Beckett controversy itself is well documented and noted as a critical event in English 
history, ultimately ending with Henry paying public homage to the tomb o f Beckett 
following his slaughter. It is important to note that the tension between cross and crown 
did not end with Henry or the Beckett controversy. Rather, Henry’s reforms laid the 
groundwork for what would ultimately result in a pitched battle between the King and the 
Pope for supremacy in regards to the legal apparatus (and thus the primacy in the realm) 
throughout the following centuries. (Henry’s distant successor, Henry VIII, would 
ultimately break away from Rome and establish the Church o f England).
The legal reforms o f  Henry II touched all aspects o f the legal field at the time.
The four petty assizes consolidated royal authority and jurisdiction over land disputes, 
both secular and temporal. They further served as the coup de grace for feudal structures 
which gave manorial lords and barons greater authority than the king. While the 
relationship between king and baron remained mutually dependent, primacy was shifted 
from the barons (during the reign o f Stephen) to the king (under Henry II). The Writ of 
Novel Disseisin is regarded as the immediate predecessor o f the modem day notion o f a 
trial by jury, while the Writ o f Mort d ’Ancestor solidified the notion o f familial 
inheritance.53 The assizes o f  Utrum and Darrein presentment gave the king a claim to 
near unbridled jurisdiction when it came to land disputes over Church property. In sum,
49 Plucknett, 111
50 IBID
51 Sameul E. T horne “The Assize ‘U trum ’ and Canon Law in England” Columbia Law Review Vol. 33 No. 
3 (M arch 1933): 432
52 IBID
53 Chas T. Colem an “Origin and Developm ent o f  Trial by Jury” Virginia Law Review Vol. 6 No. 2 
(N ovem ber 1919): 82
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the consolidation o f civil reform under Henry II centralized legal authority to the 
seigniorial courts.
In matters o f criminal prosecution, the use o f the presentment jury and the 
Constitution o f Clarendon remains the model for the grand jury system today. While trial 
by petit jury would come after the reign o f Henry II, it was Henry’s reforms that set in 
motion the precedents that would form the body today known as English Common Law. 
The use o f communal accusation and public prosecution was codified under the reign of 
Henry, and the process for personal prosecution was given a set o f  procedures by which 
royal influence would hold the most sway.54
While these reforms, when taken together, constitute a radical and ingenious 
evolution o f legal instrumentation, they were not intended as such. Rather, each assize 
and each constitution as enacted by Henry as a means o f achieving greater centralization 
and efficiency o f administration throughout his kingdom. Control was his objective, law 
was his vessel, jurisdiction his instrument, and political savvy his means o f attainment. 
Ultimately, the legal reforms o f Henry II revolutionized legal administration in England 
and formed the basis o f English Common Law.
54 IBID
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